An Evaluation of Maglev Technology and Its Comparison With High Speed Rail by Vuchic, Vukan R & Casello, Jeffrey Michael
University of Pennsylvania
ScholarlyCommons
Departmental Papers (ESE) Department of Electrical & Systems Engineering
2002
An Evaluation of Maglev Technology and Its
Comparison With High Speed Rail
Vukan R. Vuchic
University of Pennsylvania, vuchic@seas.upenn.edu
Jeffrey Michael Casello
University of Pennsylvania
Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.upenn.edu/ese_papers
Part of the Systems Engineering Commons, and the Transportation Engineering Commons
This paper is posted at ScholarlyCommons. https://repository.upenn.edu/ese_papers/820
For more information, please contact repository@pobox.upenn.edu.
Recommended Citation
Vukan R. Vuchic and Jeffrey Michael Casello, "An Evaluation of Maglev Technology and Its Comparison With High Speed Rail",
Transportation Quarterly 56(2), 33-49. January 2002.
An Evaluation of Maglev Technology and Its Comparison With High
Speed Rail
Abstract
High speed rail (HSR) systems have a proven record of efficient services in about a dozen countries. Recently,
Magnetic Levitation (Maglev) technology for high speed ground transportation (HSGT) has been proposed
for many intercity and regional lines in Germany, Japan, United States, and other countries. Maglev developers
claim that their system can achieve higher speeds, have lower energy consumption and life cycle costs, attract
more passengers, and produce less noise and vibration than high speed rail. This article presents a systematic
comparison of the proposed Maglev system, specifically the German Transrapid, and high speed rail systems.
The analysis reaches the following conclusions on the three most important system characteristics. First,
recent developments of HSR have reduced the advantage of Maglev in higher speeds, so that the differences in
travel times on typical interstation spacings would be small. Second, high speed rail has a huge advantage over
Maglev due to HSR’s compatibility with existing rail networks. Third, high speed rail involves a lower
investment cost, while operating costs on Maglev are still uncertain. Energy consumption is estimated to be
lower for high speed rail. All other features, like riding comfort, system image, grade climbing ability, noise,
etc., are not significant enough to make one mode superior to the other. Thus the benefits of high speed rail
strongly outweigh Maglev’s small travel time advantage. Based on this conclusion, the soundness and
direction of US federal policy of investing in Maglev systems while neglecting high speed rail and Amtrak is
questioned.
Disciplines
Engineering | Systems Engineering | Transportation Engineering
This journal article is available at ScholarlyCommons: https://repository.upenn.edu/ese_papers/820
33
Transportation Quarterly, Vol. 56, No. 2, Spring 2002 (33–49).
©2002 Eno Transportation Foundation, Inc., Washington, DC.
Any proposal for an entirely new trans-portation mode requires a thorough system analysis that must address,
among others, the following questions:
1. Is there a demand for the new mode?
2. Is the proposed new mode feasible, and
shown to be operationally ready for
implementation?
3. What is the current state of existing modes
serving this demand?
4. Does the proposed mode as a package of
benefits and costs improve upon the cur-
rent modes?
The purpose of this article is to analyze a
proposed new mode of guided high speed
ground transportation (HSGT), Maglev, and
evaluate its technical, economic, social and
other aspects. The need for high speed
ground transportation modes is discussed in
the following section. To provide the relevant
background and needed understanding of
issues involved in introducing a new mode of
An Evaluation of Maglev Technology
and Its Comparison With 
High Speed Rail
High speed rail (HSR) systems have a proven record of efficient services in about a dozen coun-
tries. Recently, Magnetic Levitation (Maglev) technology for high speed ground transportation
(HSGT) has been proposed for many intercity and regional lines in Germany, Japan, United
States, and other countries. Maglev developers claim that their system can achieve higher
speeds, have lower energy consumption and life cycle costs, attract more passengers, and
produce less noise and vibration than high speed rail. This article presents a systematic com-
parison of the proposed Maglev system, specifically the German Transrapid, and high speed
rail systems.
The analysis reaches the following conclusions on the three most important system char-
acteristics. First, recent developments of HSR have reduced the advantage of Maglev in high-
er speeds, so that the differences in travel times on typical interstation spacings would be small.
Second, high speed rail has a huge advantage over Maglev due to HSR’s compatibility with
existing rail networks. Third, high speed rail involves a lower investment cost, while operating
costs on Maglev are still uncertain. Energy consumption is estimated to be lower for high
speed rail. All other features, like riding comfort, system image, grade climbing ability, noise,
etc., are not significant enough to make one mode superior to the other. Thus the benefits of
high speed rail strongly outweigh Maglev’s small travel time advantage. Based on this con-
clusion, the soundness and direction of US federal policy of investing in Maglev systems while
neglecting high speed rail and Amtrak is questioned.
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transportation, the developments in high
speed ground transportation are presented.
Two sections focus on present status of high
speed rail networks and speeds, and Maglev
transportation system development. This
leads to the next section with the very impor-
tant comparison of Maglev with high speed
rail systems, including technical, operational
and network/system aspects of these two
transportation modes. Lastly, a review of US
federal policy with respect to high speed
ground transportation is presented.
This article draws heavily on previous
research work evaluating the proposed Balti-
more—Washington Maglev System1 present-
ed in an unpublished report by this paper’s
prime author.2 This original report led to
substantial debate on the viability of Maglev
systems.3
HIGH SPEED GROUND TRANSPORTATION
The Increasing Need for HSGT
The need for high speed ground transporta-
tion systems has greatly intensified in recent
decades. All industrialized countries have
faced two serious transportation problems in
urbanized regions and in major intercity cor-
ridors. First, highway and street congestion
have become a chronic problem, causing
longer travel times, economic inefficiencies,
and deterioration of the environment and
quality of life. Second, congestion problems
are occurring at airports, with similar high
user and social costs.
Under these worsening transportation
conditions, high speed ground transporta-
tion has emerged as a vital concept. HSGT
is by far the most efficient means for trans-
porting large passenger volumes with high
speed, reliability, passenger comfort, and
safety. While highway and air traffic consist
of thousands of vehicles driven by individ-
ual drivers following mostly advisory traffic
control devices, high speed ground trans-
portation is a physically guided system on
fully controlled ways with fail-safe electronic
signal control. This provides not only an
order of magnitude higher safety but also
reliable operation even under capacity condi-
tions.
While high performance and environmen-
tal compatibility are necessary features of
HSGT, the high speed is critical in determin-
ing the optimal role of this mode. Conven-
tional railways operating with maximum
speeds of 100 kilometers per hour—km/h—
(in the US, with the exception of the North-
east Corridor, maximum speeds are still lim-
ited to 125 km/h only) cannot compete with
freeway travel in the same corridors. Similar-
ly, because of the speed restrictions on high
speed rail, air travel dominates on distances
exceeding 300-400 km. Thus, railways were
losing their market, except when highway
congestion, restricted parking or other fac-
tors made travel by other modes very incon-
venient.
The Importance of High Speed and 
Its Optimal Values
One of the goals in building HSR systems has
been to increase the domain in which railway
is the superior mode not only in convenience
but also in speed or travel time. This goal has
been successfully achieved in many locations.
The introduction of the first Train a Grande
Vitesse (TGV) on a new 417 km long line
between Paris and Lyon in 1981, resulted in
switching most of the air travel on this link to
TGV.4 Developers of the German Intercity
Express (ICE) set the goal that high speed rail
should offer average travel speed twice high-
er than the car and half as high as air travel
(including the advantage of railway in center
city delivery, instead of remote airports). The
introduction of an electrified line with Acela
trains is expected to divert many trips
between Boston and New York from air to
Amtrak. Based on these advances of high
speed ground transportation in increasing its
35
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increased from 400 to 450 km/h, the gain
would be only 3.9 minutes. This shows
that for any given distance, the marginal
value of increasing the maximum speed
results in decreasing travel time savings.
In other words, the speed increase from
200 to 250 km/h is much more effective
than an increase (hypothetically) from
400 to 450 km/h.
b. Travel time reductions due to higher
speeds depend very much on the length of
run between stations. This is also shown
in Figure 1. For example, if maximum
speed is increased from 250 to 300 km/h,
travel time will be reduced by 9.7 minutes
on a 250 km long run; the same speed
increase would bring only a 2.6 minute
travel time saving on a 100 km long run,
and a negligible saving of 1.7 minutes on
optimal domain, it is now considered the
range in which it can have a dominant role is
between 100 and 1,000 km, depending on
the relative speed of high speed ground trans-
portation and its competitors in a given cor-
ridor.
Reducing travel time is critical to its suc-
cess. However, the limits to which top speeds
should be increased deserves careful scrutiny:
a. Increases in maximum speed have
decreasing marginal gains in travel time
savings. As illustrated in Figure 1, on a
250 km long interstation distance an
increase in maximum speed from 150 to
200 km/h reduces travel time by 24.7
minutes; from 200 to 250 km/h saves
another 14.7 minutes. A further speed
increase from 250 to 300 km/h saves only
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Assumptions: average accel. rate = 0.9m/s^2
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Figure 1: Impact of Increases in Maximum Speed on Travel Times for Different Station-to-
Station Distances
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a 50 km long run. This shows that the
benefits from high speeds are great on
long interstation distances but very small
or negligible on short distances.
c. Marginal cost of increases in maximum
speed (in system design, construction,
operating costs, etc.) grows more than
proportionally with speed. In addition to
increased precision required in guideway
and vehicle design, energy consumption
increases with the speed due to the expo-
nential increase of air resistance.
To summarize, the cost-effectiveness of
investments in designing higher speed systems
decreases as the maximum speed grows.
These facts show that the optimal domain
for high speed ground transportation sys-
tems is on long interstation lengths, such as
100 km. On shorter distances, the gains in
travel time are so small that it is difficult to
justify the high investment. For example,
very important and functional lines between
center cities and airports (Frankfurt, Zürich,
and London-Heathrow are outstanding
examples) may not be candidates for HSGT
(as proposed for Pittsburgh, Baltimore,
Munich, and Shanghai), because they require
much higher costs and bring very little addi-
tional benefit, regardless of technology.
d. It is also important to emphasize that with
respect to maximum speed there are two
very different concepts:
—Maximum experimental speed for any
transportation system technology is the
speed reached under specially planned
and arranged conditions, for which the
guideway, power pickup, signals and vehi-
cles are specially equipped; the test is usu-
ally done under special operational
arrangements, safety precautions, etc.
—Maximum operating speed is the speed
for which the system has been designed for
regular, daily operation under normal con-
ditions. The entire system—its infrastruc-
ture, vehicles, controls, reliability, etc.,
must be designed so that this speed can be
operated on a daily basis, withstanding the
handling of passengers, reasonable weath-
er variations, and operated by qualified
personnel (but not an entire team of spe-
cialists supervising and intervening in
every minute of system operation).
Maximum experimental speed is very impor-
tant for evaluation of the system’s character-
istics and potential for development. Howev-
er, it is the maximum operating speed that
defines actual, achievable performance of the
system. The difference between the two is
quite large: maximum experimental speed
may be as much as 50-80% greater than the
maximum operating speed. Consequently, it
is very important to distinguish these two
speeds, and in comparing different systems,
to always compare the two corresponding
speeds. Comparing the maximum experi-
mental speed of one system to the maximum
operating speed of another system is false
and highly misleading.
DEVELOPMENTS OF HIGH SPEED RAIL
A brief review of the development of the high
speed rail transportation systems, the only
technology currently used for high speed
ground transportation, is given here.
Through these years of extensive develop-
ments, high speed rail has been defined as
rail systems providing regular services at
speeds exceeding 200 km/h.
Developments in Different Countries Since
the 1960s
Japan built the first high speed rail system,
and thus initiated the concept of high speed
ground transportation, when it opened the
first Shinkansen Line in the Tokaido Corri-
dor (Tokyo-Osaka) in 1964, with cruising
(operating) speed of 210 km/h. This
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Shinkansen Line was later extended to
Fukuoka, including a tunnel between the
islands of Honshu and Kyushu, with a total
length of 1,079 km. The operating speeds
have been raised, through improved infra-
structure and rolling stock, to 240, 270 and,
finally, 300 km/h. This line carries more than
400,000 passengers per day.
Progress in extending and further improv-
ing the Shinkansen is continuous.
Shinkansen-type trains, which are somewhat
smaller size and lower speeds, have been
introduced also on some narrow-gauge lines
(1.067 meters); double decker cars have been
successfully introduced; new lines are being
built; and speeds of 350 km/h are being
designed. These lines have a reputation for
high reliability, comfort and safety, and have
operated for decades without a passenger
fatality, despite the extremely high passen-
ger volumes.
France opened its first TGV line between
Paris and Lyon, 417 km long, in 1981. The
line attracted high ridership from the begin-
ning, including many previous car trips,
newly generated trips, and the majority of
airline trips on this intercity corridor. Cruis-
ing speed on this line has been 270 km/h.
In the following years, TGV Atlantique
was built from Paris to the southwest, then
to Lille in the north and the Channel Tun-
nel. Extension from Lyon to Marseilles on
the Mediterranean Coast was opened in June
2001, with maximum operating speeds
exceeding 330 km/h.
Germany was several years behind France
in opening its first high speed rail line in
1991, ICE, between Hannover and Würz-
burg with a maximum operating speed of
250 km/h. However, Germany was the
leader in upgrading a number of existing rail
lines to the speed of 200 km/h, at a much
lower investment than new high speed rail
lines require. Although with less publicity,
many lines in Germany have been operating
at this speed since the 1980s.
Several new lines have been opened or are
under construction in Germany, including
Mannheim-Stuttgart, Frankfurt-Cologne,
Berlin-Hannover, and Berlin-Hamburg.
Italy, Spain, Belgium, Sweden, The
Netherlands, Taiwan, Korea, and several
other countries have also been active in this
field with some lines in operation in the for-
mer five countries, and some under construc-
tion in the latter two. 
The United States has given much less
attention to high speed rail than most of its
peers. Similar to Great Britain, the govern-
ment and Congress consider minimizing
operating assistance to intercity passenger
railroad services (Amtrak) more important
than maximum passenger attraction. The
imposed requirement by Congress on Amtrak
to achieve economic self-sufficiency by 2003,
has forced Amtrak to introduce extremely
high fares. These fares prevent attraction of
many trips from highways, where no self-suf-
ficiency requirement is imposed. 
The first high speed rail system in the Unit-
ed States, Acela in the Northeast Corridor,
has been introduced only recently, in 2000.
This progress is, however, only upgrading of
an existing line, and that is happening
decades after Japan, France, Germany, and
other industrialized countries opened their
first entirely new high speed rail lines.
MAGLEV VS. HIGH SPEED RAIL
Amtrak’s Acela is the first high speed rail system
introduced in the United States. Source: Amtrak.
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Present Status of HSR Networks and Speeds
In summary, high speed rail lines have been
operating for 38 years with excellent effi-
ciency and safety. Initially opened as individ-
ual lines, HSR has grown since the 1980s
into networks with more than 1,000 km in
Japan and a European system with integrat-
ed lines between France (with the Channel
Tunnel to Great Britain), Switzerland, Ger-
many, and Belgium. With many lines under
construction, high speed rail will in a few
years also connect Sweden, Denmark, The
Netherlands, Italy, and Spain. They have
been remarkably successful in attracting pas-
sengers and improving economic efficiency.
Basic compatibility of all these rail systems
is a fundamental feature for construction of
this integrated international network of high
speed ground transportation lines.
As noted above, maximum operating
speed is the most important element of high
speed rail, and its phenomenal progress in
the world’s most developed systems requires
some elaboration. Test runs during the 1960s
and 1970s gradually increased maximum
experimental speeds from 250 to 350 km/h.
A major breakthrough happened in Ger-
many in 1988, when an ICE test train
achieved 406 km/h. This was followed by
another leap in the speed record in 1991,
when on an experimental run, a TGV train
established the record speed for rail systems
of 515 km/h! Maximum operating speeds,
achieved by hundreds of trains daily in sev-
eral countries, are now in the range of 250
and 300 km/h, with the French TGV system
recently achieving an average speed of 317
km/h on a 1,000 km run.
MAGLEV TRANSPORTATION SYSTEM
DEVELOPMENT
Since the 1960s, more than 100 new guided
transportation systems have been proposed
as concepts, and several dozen of them have
been physically developed and tested. As in
every research and development process,
many of these concepts were unrealistic and
infeasible, but a few have progressed to full
development and successful implementation.
Examples are the ALWEG Monorail (Seattle,
Tokyo, and several other Japanese cities),
Westinghouse C-100 People Mover (in many
airports, Downtown Miami), MATRA’s VAL
system (Lille, Toulouse, Chicago O’Hare Air-
port), UTDC’s Skytrain (Vancouver, Toron-
to—utilizing Linear Induction Motors—
LIM, similar to Maglev systems), and several
others.
Magnetic Levitation (the Maglev trans-
portation system) is another new technology
for guided transportation systems with
strong public appeal because of its unique
feature: the vehicles are supported as well as
propelled by magnetic forces, so that there
is no physical contact between wheels and
guideway surfaces. A brief history of Maglev
developments is presented here.
Maglev for Urban Transportation 
Research and development of Maglev trans-
portation systems started in Germany
around 1970, and it produced two systems:
an urban transit system, Transurban, and an
intercity high-speed system, Transrapid.
The Transurban system was believed to be
ready for application and the government of
Ontario contracted its manufacturer in 1973
High Speed Rail technology: French TGV train, Paris-
Lyon. Source: F. Dechamps.
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to build a line in Toronto. However, after
construction had started, the system faced
technical problems in test operations, includ-
ing difficulties with vehicles negotiating
curves. The specifications of the system could
not be achieved, and the project was can-
celled.
Another version of an urban transit sys-
tem utilizing Maglev technology was more
successful. The M-Bahn system, also devel-
oped in Germany, was built and successfully
operated on two short lines, in Berlin and in
the airport of Birmingham, England. Both
systems were later dismantled for nontech-
nical reasons.
Intercity Maglev Developments in 
Germany and Japan
Transrapid development proceeded because
Maglev operating features are more effective
when applied to high speed than to low- and
moderate-speed transportation systems.
Strongly encouraged and financially support-
ed by the German government, Maglev has
been researched and developed through a
succession of models, presently reaching the
eighth generation—Transrapid 8. A full-
scale, 30 km long oval test track has been
built in Emsland, Germany, where thousands
of train runs have been performed, proving
physical feasibility of this new system. It 
has also reached the maximum speed of 
436 km/h on a test run, and it is claimed that
the limiting factor was the length of the 
test track. The test facility has been open to
visitors for many years, with thousands of
persons having ridden the Transrapid 
system.
During the last 20 years there have been
efforts to implement the Transrapid system.
Numerous proposals were made in Germany
for various new intercity lines, but the most
serious proposal was for a new Berlin-Ham-
burg line.5,6 The alignment and station loca-
tions were selected and the design was pre-
pared in great detail. After eight years of
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intensive planning, design, and discussions of
impacts and costs, a final evaluation was
made of the entire project, including a com-
parison with high speed rail technology. The
project was faced with escalating infrastruc-
ture cost estimates, increasing project com-
plexity, decreased ridership projections, and
lingering questions regarding the advantages
of Maglev technology over HSR systems.7,8
In February 2000, the decision was made to
cancel the Maglev project and build the
Berlin-Hamburg line with high speed rail
technology.
The cancellation of the Berlin-Hamburg
project raised various points and a question:
this 292 km long line has a length where
Maglev could fully utilize its high-speed per-
formance, it connects the two largest German
cities with intensive travel, and it can use an
alignment without many obstacles. If Maglev
is not feasible for that line, is there any poten-
tial for it in Germany?8 Yet, Maglev promot-
ers called for the allocated DM6.1B (US $3B)
federal funds to be used for Transrapid
demonstration projects at other locations.
Among numerous proposals, two have
become “finalists”: a 37 km long line in
Munich, from the railway station in center
city to its recently opened airport, and a 78
km long “Metrorapid” line from Düsseldorf
to Dortmund, serving cities in the Ruhr area.
The debate about these projects includes
diverse views. Promoters expect benefits for
Maglev technology: German Transrapid train. 
Source: Maryland Mass Transit Administration.
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the German industry and potential for
export; critics challenge the purpose of build-
ing Maglev on the lines where its high speed
capabilities bring little advantage over the
parallel railway lines at an extremely high
investment and uncertain operating costs.
In addition to these serious technical stud-
ies and projects, there has been an intensive
publicity campaign aimed at showing Tran-
srapid applications in dozens of corridors
around the world. Lists were published iden-
tifying 28 corridors in the United States
alone, with a total length of 16,311 km as
“candidates” for Transrapid. The potential
export market was one of the arguments
used intensively in Germany to secure gov-
ernment financing for system development
and later implementation. Interestingly, a
strong argument used by Maglev promoters
in the US to get federal funding was that this
system would have a strong export potential
for US industry.
Research and development of Maglev
technology in Japan dates as far back as
1962, but major efforts to develop a high-
speed Maglev system began in the 1970s. The
technology is somewhat different than the
German Transrapid: the Japanese model uti-
lizes superconductivity and the vehicle-guide-
way design is based on repulsive magnetic
forces, while Transrapid uses attracting mag-
netic forces. The repulsive suspension tech-
nique is inefficient at low speeds, so that
trains run on rubber tires up to the speed of
100 km/h before becoming magnetically lev-
itated. This dual suspension makes vehicles
more complex, but the tests of high speed
running have proven the technological feasi-
bility of the system.9,10 In fact, the Japanese
Maglev system, now known as MLX01,
holds the world record with an experimental
speed of 551 km/h. In testing, two Maglev
vehicles met on adjacent guideways while
traveling at a relative speed of 1,003 km/h!11
Extensive planning of a new Tokyo-
Osaka line has been underway in recent
years. However, no final decision about con-
struction has been reached. There is present-
ly an effort to further develop the Maglev
system, including modifications to the guide-
way, a significant change that will require a
multiyear effort of development and testing.
In conclusion, extensive developments
and testing of Maglev train technology have
been made in Germany and Japan for sever-
al decades. Test vehicles have carried passen-
gers on short lines at exhibits and test tracks.
Major efforts to construct a line that will uti-
lize this technology have been made for
many years at many locations, but only one
line has been committed to construction:
During spring 2001 Shanghai signed a con-
tract to construct a Transrapid line from the
city to the airport. In Germany and Japan
there is no line in operation or under con-
struction yet.
COMPARISON OF MAGLEV WITH THE
HIGH SPEED RAIL SYSTEM
Based on the analysis presented above, we
can now answer three of the four questions
presented in the introduction.
1. Is there demand for Maglev? Functional-
ly, Maglev represents a high speed ground
transportation system, for which there is
an increasing need in many major corri-
dors, as shown above in the high speed
ground transportation section. It is likely
that this need will increase in the future.
2. Is Maglev feasible? Maglev represents new
technology: magnetic levitation and linear
induction motor(LIM) propulsion. Clear-
ly, to be deployed, a system must be phys-
ically and operationally feasible not only
under controlled conditions, but also in
permanent operation under “real world”
conditions. This includes such external
factors as public reaction, handling crowd-
ed conditions, adverse weather, incidental
occurrences of technical defects, short
power interruptions, etc. As explained in
the above section focusing on Intercity
41
Maglev developments in Germany and
Japan, all indications are that this question
can be answered positively for both sys-
tems, Transrapid and MLX01. The
Maglev system can be considered to be
technically and operationally feasible.
3. What existing modes are available for
high speed ground transportation? High
speed rail currently serves this demand
and has a proven performance record
(speed, safety, efficiency, reliability, etc.),
and a known cost structure.
4. Is the proposed Maglev transportation
system, as a “package” of performance,
costs, positive and negative impacts and
externalities, better than, or at least com-
parable to the existing systems which can
provide the same type of service? This
question, critical in deciding which mode
should be selected for given lines or inter-
city corridors, is evaluated in a condensed
form in the following section. This com-
parison is extremely important, but has
been given little attention or avoided in
the proposals for Maglev projects.
Common Errors in Comparing Modes 
It is a common phenomenon that a new
transportation system, utilizing a new tech-
nology or method of operation, is presented
to civic and political leaders, and the general
public—citing not only innovative features
but also many features not unique to that
technology. Often, comparisons are present-
ed of a new, perfectly designed system with
an existing system, designed many years ago,
sometimes worn out from long operation.
This kind of “promotional” presentation of
new modes and systems has been used for
many systems, such as monorails, pneumat-
ic tube trains, GRT (group rapid transit), O-
Bahn, and numerous others, most of which
were either physically infeasible, or inferior
to existing systems.12
A professional review of the specific dif-
ferences between the new and existing modes
is often performed later, and it obtains much
less publicity than the promotional or “mar-
keting” efforts. In most cases such systemat-
ic, objective comparisons show that many of
the cited “advantages” of the new system
MAGLEV VS. HIGH SPEED RAIL
Figure 2: Maximum Speeds of High Speed Ground Transportation Modes
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were actually not unique to the proposed
system: that a newly built system with con-
ventional technology would have many of
the same features, while involving lower or
no development costs, sometimes having
lower operating costs, and proven mainte-
nance procedures.
A rational, unbiased comparison of two
technologies, based on a systematic evalua-
tion of their major elements must be made.
The two modes must be compared with each
other as “packages” of their performance/ 
costs/impacts. This is a standard methodol-
ogy for comparison of alternative proposed
modes for a specific area or alignment.13
Comparison of HSR and Maglev Systems
The experiences and data about the latest
HSR and Maglev systems’ performance, as
collected from the technical literature, are
used for the following summary review of
the major characteristics of the two tech-
nologies.
Maximum Speeds and Travel Times
The widespread belief that Maglev would
operate at much higher speeds than HSR
comes from an incorrect comparison: maxi-
mum experimental speeds of Maglev systems
are being compared with operating speeds
of high speed rail. As discussed above, these
two speeds are drastically different, and the
proper comparison can be made only
between the corresponding speeds. Thus, the
comparison, shown in Figure 2, is as follows.
The difference between maximum speeds
of Maglev and HSR has been drastically
reduced in recent years.14 The maximum
experimental speeds of the two modes are in
the same range: for Maglev (Japanese), it is
551 km/h, HSR (France) has achieved 515
km/h, and German Transrapid, 450 km/h.
With respect to operating speed, hundreds
of HSR trains operate daily on several lines
at the speed of 300 km/h, and an average
speed of 317 km/h was achieved on the new
Lyon-Marseilles TGV line. Infrastructure for
the Madrid-Barcelona line is being designed
for maximum speeds of 350 km/h, and top
speeds on TGV have now reached 366 km/h.
Since there is no operating Maglev line, a
regular operating speed of that system
remains to be proven. It would certainly be
substantially lower than the experimental
speeds. Therefore, assumed operating speeds
on proposed Maglev lines are hypothetical,
not more realistic than assuming the same
speed for a high speed rail system.
If we assume, however, that Maglev
achieves in operation 420 km/h, regularly
reached in Transrapid test operations, the
impact of this higher speed than high speed
rail has on travel times on most interstation
spacings would be small. As the diagram in
Figure 1 shows, increasing the maximum
speed from 350 km/h (HSR) to 420 km/h on
a 100 km run results in travel time savings
of approximately 1 minute.
Initial acceleration rates of high speed rail
and Transrapid are comparable, because
they are limited by passenger comfort. Tran-
srapid has a higher acceleration rate than
HSR in higher speed domains, which gives
it an advantage on long interstation spacings.
Yet, in most cases this results in a small per-
centage reduction in travel time.
Maglev promoters correctly claim that
Transrapid can travel faster through curves
with limited radii and negotiate gradients of
up to 10%, while high speed rail is limited
to 4%. The fact is, however, that most of
these features are irrelevant in actual appli-
cations. Excessive guideway superelevations
in curves are not acceptable for vehicles
which have standing passengers, and it
would be hardly practical to design a high
speed ground transportation line with 8-
10% gradient, regardless of technology.
Thus, in actual design it becomes obvious
that these technological maximum capabili-
ties seldom translate into higher operating
speeds. For example, simulation of the pro-
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posed Baltimore-Washington Transrapid line
shows that it would have an average speed of
183 km/h. On a line with similar length, the
Japanese Shinkansen travels at 209 km/h.
Consequently, Transrapid still has higher
maximum speed and acceleration in high-
speed ranges than high speed rail, but its
advantage in travel times over typical inter-
station spacings would be quite small. Even
on spacings of 100 km, the difference would
be about 1 minute.
Intermodal Compatibility and 
Network Aspects
Maglev’s switches are much more complex
than rail switches. Therefore Maglev is less
capable of serving different branches or
interconnected networks. The Maglev sys-
tem is primarily conceived as a mode to serve
long distance travel by a single shuttle-type
line, rather than a connected network.
High speed rail, with its simple switches
and extensive existing networks, is designed
and operated as a transportation network,
with benefits to both the operator and the
passenger. With the exception of the Japan-
ese Shinkansen lines, all other high-speed rail
lines, although designed to different stan-
dards for high-speed operation, allow their
trains to extend their running to existing rail
facilities. This results in great benefits from
lower construction costs (joint use of tracks,
yards, maintenance and other facilities and
entire sections of lines), shorter implementa-
tion times, fewer environmental impacts,
lower external costs, and reduced local
opposition to construction.
While building new sections for high
speed operations, providing connections to
existing lines extends the reach of the high
speed rail network, allowing high speed
trains to be routed to cities not directly on
new lines. For example, ICE trains in Ger-
many go from the new high speed line
between Hannover-Würzburg to Hamburg,
Frankfurt and other cities at speeds of 200
km/h or less. Similarly, Amtrak’s Acela trains
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could operate to Harrisburg at speeds which
that line allows. This network integration
ability results not only in great convenience
to passengers, but also reduces the need for
transfers, which can often offset the travel
time gains achieved by high speed rail.
Thus, the intermodal compatibility and
network aspects of high speed rail make it
superior to the Maglev system.
Investment Costs, Operating Costs, and
Energy Consumption
Guideway and station construction costs
depend very much on the alignment, prima-
rily whether the guideway is constructed at
grade, aerially or in tunnel. Maglev requires
entirely separate rights-of-way, special facili-
ties that are incompatible with existing sys-
tems. This results in substantially higher
investments in terminal areas, particularly
in tunnels, due to its larger profile. For any
given alignment, estimates in the USDOT15
report indicate that Maglev would have
somewhat (10-20%) higher costs than high
speed rail. Subsequent estimates for the seven
US demonstration projects and several Ger-
man proposals show a much greater cost dif-
ference, with Maglev expenditures about
two times greater than those for high speed
rail. In addition, HSR can use existing tracks
for some short sections, particularly in
downtown areas, where construction costs
are highest. Consequently, with respect to
investment costs HSR is significantly superi-
or to Maglev in the same corridor and on a
comparable alignment.
Maintenance costs are sometimes claimed
to be lower (or even nonexistent) for Maglev,
but this seems to be an unrealistic assump-
tion. Maglev has a significant advantage due
to its lack of physical contact with the guide-
way, but any change in highly precise align-
ment would require extremely costly repairs.
Moreover, very complex electronic instru-
mentation on the guideway and on trains
requires very sophisticated maintenance.
Estimated maintenance costs per kilometer
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figures for the seven proposed Maglev proj-
ects in the US vary among themselves by as
much as a factor of 10.16 More information
on this item is needed from suitable demon-
stration projects to make a valid compari-
son of the two modes.
Maglev does not have wheel resistance as
rail vehicles do, but its magnetic levitation
requires continuous energy consumption,
which may be greater than the energy
required to overcome wheel rolling resist-
ance. Another factor in energy consumption
is the use of the linear induction motor—
LIM, which uses more energy than the rotat-
ing electric motor. It has been observed that
systems utilizing LIM, such as the Vancouver
Skytrain and the Toronto Scarborough line,
use between 20 and 30% more energy for
traction than similar rail vehicles with con-
ventional rotating electric motors (in this
comparison both types of vehicles are on
wheels, so that levitation has no influence on
energy consumption).
For all these reasons Transrapid is likely
to have substantially higher energy con-
sumption per square meter of vehicle floor
area than the latest German high-speed rail
train, ICE-3. An analysis by Hanstein17,18 has
shown that when correct comparisons
between Transrapid and ICE-3 are made,
i.e., consumption per square meter of car
floor, the former shows higher energy con-
sumption. Jäns19 data confirm this. In con-
clusion, high speed rail consumes less ener-
gy than Maglev per comparable unit of train
capacity.
Riding Comfort
Extremely high comfort—smooth ride and
low internal noise—have been amply
demonstrated on most of the existing high
speed rail systems, including the Japanese
Shinkansen, French TGV and German ICE
systems. Visitors driven on the Transrapid
and, particularly, on the Japanese test
Maglev train, have often experienced consid-
erable vibrations and noise levels. Thus, high
speed rail still has an advantage over Maglev
with respect to riding comfort.
System Image and Passenger Attraction
It is argued that a demonstration line of
Transrapid is needed to test and evaluate
public acceptance of this new mode, vehicle
levitation and high speed travel. Actually, the
greatest innovation among these elements is
high speed travel, for which the public has
already demonstrated acceptance with the
introduction of Shinkansen and TGV, prima-
rily because of large time savings. Innovative
technical features, such as welded rails offer-
ing smoother ride and lower rolling resist-
ance and high-speed rail switches, while sig-
nificant for improved system performance,
did not have a direct influence on passenger
attraction.
It is likely that the shape and levitation of
Transrapid trains would have very good
public appeal. High speed rail systems, how-
ever, now also have a drastically different
form and look than conventional railways
had only 25 years ago, and new body designs
are continuously being developed. It is there-
fore difficult to find any major difference
between the appearances of the two modes.
The long-term impact of these exotic fea-
tures, however, is likely to be limited, as has
been demonstrated by monorails. Since the
demonstration projects of the 1950s and
1960s, monorails have been called the “sys-
tem of the future.” However, monorails are
used only where exotic novelty is more
important than passenger service and operat-
ing efficiency: Disney World, Las Vegas, and
similar other locations. It should be noted
that incompatibility of monorails with other
modes is one of their major shortcomings.
It can be said that Transrapid would ini-
tially have an advantage over HSR with
respect to public appeal; on the other hand,
rail systems are known to draw a great pub-
lic appeal with their rail technology and net-
work operations with interline schedules,
45
MAGLEV VS. HIGH SPEED RAIL
Table 1: Comparison of Maglev and HSR Technologies in Critical Systems Characteristics
SYSTEM FEATURES MAGLEV HSR
a.  Travel time factors
• Maximum speeds 420 – 450 km/h 300 – 350 km/h
(261 - 280 mph) (186 - 217 mph)
• Acceleration rates Higher at upper speed range
b.  Intermodal compatibility
• Network connectivity None / single lines Excellent / extensive networks
• Use of existing New and elevated guideways, New lines combined with existing
infrastructure tunnels and stations needed lines and stations can be used
c. Costs
• Investment costs16 $12 - 55 M / km $6 - 25 M / km
($19 - 88 M / mile) ($10 - 40 M / mile)
• Operating and maintenance Uncertain Known
costs
• Energy consumption17 Higher than HSR
d.  Additional factors
• Riding comfort Superior
• System image / passenger Excellent, plus initial Excellent / superior network     
attraction innovation interest accessibility
• Impacts on surroundings Lower noise and vibration Tracks mostly at grade
Sources: See Endnotes 16 and 17
Table 2:  Selected Inherent Advantages of HSGT Technological Options
Advantages of technologies with respect to each other 
(+ means the technology has an apparent inherent 
advantage)
Selected Characteristics Accelerail New HSR Maglev
Trip-time and revenue performance + +
Initial cost +
Autonomy from existing railroads + +
Through train potential over other railroads + +
Service-proven technology and cost structure + +
Source: See Endnote 15
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etc., which Transrapid would not have. The
passenger attraction would depend on the
speed, comfort and integration with other
modes, not differences in vehicle support and
propulsion method.
It is not likely that either high speed rail or
Maglev would have a significant advantage
over the other in system image and passenger
attraction.
Impacts on Surroundings
Indications are that Maglev, not having
physical contact with guideway, has lower
noise20 and vibration along the line than high
speed rail. Rail lines have an advantage in
their greater ability to utilize at grade tracks
in urbanized areas. In high-density areas
both modes must use tunnels.
Conclusions
The preceding comparisons of Maglev and
HSR systems features are summarized in
Table 1. Their review shows the following
differences in the three most important fea-
tures:
1. Travel time: Maglev, despite higher top
speeds and greater acceleration, has little
travel time advantage in real-world appli-
cations.
2. Intermodal compatibility: High speed rail
has an extremely significant advantage in
its compatibility with other transporta-
tion systems and with built-up areas.
3. Cost structure: High speed rail is less
expensive to construct, has a known oper-
ating cost level, and has an advantage in
energy consumption.
The remaining features, such as riding com-
fort, system image, impacts on surroundings,
as well as grade climbing capability, are of
much lesser importance (and differences
between the two systems are not major), so
that they would not have a significant influ-
ence on mode selection. 
The conclusion of this comparison is that
the advantages of Maglev over high speed
rail are few and they are very small. They are
far outweighed by the advantages of HSR,
particularly in system network and compati-
bility characteristics and investment cost.
The limitation on networking and incompat-
ibility with other transportation systems
makes Maglev extremely inconvenient for
integration in intermodal systems, which
actually represent the “transportation system
of the future.”
Consequently, there is no positive answer
to the basic question: “Why build a Maglev
system?” While that system has some exotic
features, Maglev is not competitive with
existing high speed ground transportation
systems, i.e., high speed rail. The usually
implied superiority of Maglev over high
speed rail, and its aura as a “system of the
future,” are based on an artificially created
image of superiority in speed, lower energy
consumption and better passenger attrac-
tion, none of which is supported by facts at
this time.
COMMENTS ON FEDERAL POLICY AND
ACTIONS
There is a large difference between the evalu-
ation of the technology presented above, and
the results of federally conducted studies.
The FRA report, High-Speed Ground Trans-
portation for America,21 presents a concep-
tual comparative analysis of three possible
systems for the Northeast Corridor: Accel-
erail (high speed trains on upgraded railroad
lines), high speed rail with mostly new align-
ments, and Maglev. This analysis, repro-
duced here as Table 2, correctly shows that
high speed rail has an advantage over
Maglev in its ability to use existing rail lines
(where desirable), and that it has “service-
proven technology and cost structure.”
However, being politically mandated to
justify Maglev as a “solution,” the report
deceptively compares the speeds of the two
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technologies. For HSR, current operational
speeds are set at 200 mph, while Maglev is
evaluated at 300 mph, a speed even greater
than Transrapid’s experimental speed. The
report merely mentions in a footnote that
“French National Railways have successful-
ly tested [HSR] at speeds well in excess of
200 mph.” This unrealistic speed difference
leads to passenger travel times computations
that give Maglev an advantage over high
speed rail. Thus, the conclusion of that
report that Maglev has a higher benefit/cost
ratio than HSR is based on confused con-
cepts and incorrect assumptions.
The fact that the high speed rail has a
“service proven cost structure,” while the
costs of Maglev are subject to many hypo-
thetical assumptions further undermines the
report’s conclusion that Maglev would have
a “higher benefit-cost ratio” than high speed
rail in the Northeast Corridor. Thus, distort-
ed facts about operating speeds and cost
comparisons with drastically different relia-
bilities are used to satisfy the political man-
date that Maglev should be proclaimed
“superior” to the existing modes—Accelerail
and high speed rail.
The entire US Federal Maglev Program
follows the same pattern that has taken place
in Japan and in Germany in the last couple
of decades: it is a program promoted by tech-
nology suppliers, rather than by transporta-
tion operating agencies or in response to pub-
lic needs.22 Actually, there is neither an
interest by operators, nor is there proof that
the public would benefit more from Maglev
than from other transportation systems. In
spite of the claims of great significance of this
system for industry, engineering research and
development, as well as attraction of passen-
gers exceeding that of any other mode, there
have been few concrete proposals to finance
these systems by private investors. All efforts
on Maglev projects, in Japan, Germany, and
the USA, are aimed at getting large amounts
of public funds and only limited private par-
ticipation.
The proposed Maglev Demonstration
projects in the USA (Baltimore-Washington
and Pittsburgh), in Germany (Munich and
Ruhr), as well as the line under construction
in Shanghai, are such short lines, that it will
not be possible to test and demonstrate
Maglev capabilities on them (high speed,
reliability, operating costs, and others). A
longer line with considerable passenger
potential which is not served by a railway at
present, such as Las Vegas-Los Angeles,
would be a much more appropriate demon-
stration project.
The strong and persistent promotion and
political support for this mode can be
explained by the lobbying aimed at the gen-
eral public and politicians who are laymen
with respect to transportation systems tech-
nology. Again, the same pattern exists in all
the countries: Maglev is promoted on a polit-
ical basis, while it is strongly disputed by
many professionals such as engineers and
economists.
Most Maglev reports, in Germany and
USA, include only superficial comparisons
with high speed rail, and those comparisons
are largely deceptive: Maglev is compared
with existing or upgraded railroads, rather
than with new high speed rail systems which
would be the closest alternative to the pro-
posed Maglev. Further, most benefits listed in
support of the Maglev, such as the need for
high-capacity, high-speed systems, reduction
of highway congestion, environmental bene-
fits, and others, are actually those valid for
any high speed ground transportation: they
are technology-neutral. The fact that most of
these benefits could be achieved by high
speed rail also, is not mentioned.
While both the German and Japanese
Maglev system feasibility has been demon-
strated, neither superiority nor equivalence
of this technology with high speed rail has
been proven. Disadvantages of Maglev in
comparison with high speed rail strongly
outweigh their advantages.
MAGLEV VS. HIGH SPEED RAIL
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